′ (EAX-prime) is an authenticated encryption (AE) specified by ANSI C12.22 as a standard security function for Smart Grid. EAX ′ is based on EAX proposed by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner. While EAX has a proof of security based on the pseudorandomness of the internal blockcipher, no published security result is known for EAX ′ . This paper studies the security of EAX ′ and shows that there is a sharp distinction in security of EAX ′ depending on the input length. EAX ′ encryption takes two inputs, called cleartext and plaintext, and we present various efficient attacks against EAX ′ using single-block cleartext and plaintext. At the same time we prove that if cleartexts are always longer than one block, it is provably secure based on the pseudorandomness of the blockcipher.
Introduction
ANSI C12.22 [3] specifies a blockcipher mode for authenticated encryption (AE) as the standard security function for Smart Grid. It is called EAX ′ (or EAX-prime) 5 . As its name suggests, EAX ′ is based on EAX proposed by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner at FSE 2004 [8] . Though EAX is already efficient with a small amount of precomputation, EAX ′ aims at even reducing the amount of precomputation and memory, for making it suitable to the resource-constrained devices, typically smart meters. ANSI submitted EAX ′ to NIST [15] and NIST called for the public comments on the proposal to approve EAX ′ . Following ANSI C12.22, IEEE 1703 [6] and MC1222 [4] included EAX ′ . There is also an RFC [5] related to ANSI C12.22.
Though EAX ′ is similar to EAX, to the best of our knowledge, its formal security analysis has not been published to date. In this paper, we investigate the security of EAX ′ and show that there is a sharp distinction depending on the input length. The encryption algorithm of EAX ′ takes two inputs, called cleartext and plaintext. In the standard AE terminology, the cleartext serves as a nonce, or a combination of nonce and associated data (the latter is also called header).
First, we show that if the lengths of cleartext and plaintext are not exceeding one block, there exist attacks against EAX ′ for both privacy and authenticity. Specifically, we present -forgeries, i.e., cleartext/ciphertext pairs with valid authentication tags, -chosen-plaintext distinguishers, distinguishing the EAX ′ encryption from a random encryption process, and -chosen-ciphertext plaintext recovery attacks, decrypting ciphertexts by asking for the decryption of another ciphertext with a valid authentication tag.
⋆ A part of the result was presented at DIAC [14] , and a preliminary version of this paper appears in the proceedings of FSE 2013. This is the full version. 5 The authors of [15] exchangeably use the three names, EAX ′ , EAX', and EAX-prime, to mean their proposal. To avoid any confusion by overlooking the tiny prime symbol or apostrophe, which could be misunderstood as claiming an attack on EAX, we prefer the longer name "EAX-prime" for the title. In the text we prefer the name EAX ′ .
Our attacks are simple and efficient as they require only one or two queries. The simplest one even produces a successful forgery without observing any valid plaintext/ciphertext pair. Our forgery and distinguishing attacks strictly require the target system to accept one-block cleartext and plaintext. The plaintext recovery attacks relax this condition, and given any ciphertext with one-block cleartext it works for any circumstance where ciphertext is decrypted without checking the cleartext length. This makes the possibility of attack even larger. Our attacks imply that, while the original EAX has a proof of security, the security of EAX ′ has totally collapsed as a general-purpose AE.
Next, we show that if the cleartext is always longer than one block, it recovers the provable security based on the pseudorandomness of the blockcipher for both privacy and authenticity notions. The security proof is obtained by combining previous proof techniques of EAX by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner [8] with some non-trivial extensions, such as Iwata and Kurosawa's one used for proving the security of OMAC [11] .
One may naturally wonder if our attacks are applicable to ANSI C12.22. Unfortunately we do not know if ANCI C12.22 protocols exclude one-block cleartexts or not, hence we have no clear answer. Still, considering the effect of our attacks, we conclude that EAX ′ must be used with cleartext length check mechanisms at both ends of encryption and decryption.
Preliminaries
Basic Notations. Let N = {0, 1, . . . }. Let {0, 1} * be the set of all finite-length binary strings, including the empty string ε. The bit length of a binary string X is written as |X|, and let |X| n def = ⌈|X|/n⌉. Here |ε| = 0. A concatenation of X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * is written as X∥Y or simply XY . A sequence of a zeros (ones) is denoted by 0 a (1 a ). For k ≥ 0, let {0, 1} >k def = ∪ i=k+1,... {0, 1} i and ({0, 1} n ) >k def = ∪ j=k+1,... ({0, 1} n ) j , and ({0, 1} n ) + def = ({0, 1} n ) >0 . We also define {0, 1} ≥k , ({0, 1} n ) ≥k , {0, 1} <k , ({0, 1} n ) <k , {0, 1} ≤k , and ({0, 1} n ) ≤k analogously. For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} n , X + Y or X − Y is considered as an addition or a subtraction modulo 2 n .
For a finite set X , if X is uniformly chosen from X we write X $
Specification of EAX-Prime
We describe the encryption and decryption algorithms of EAX ′ . We changed the original notations of EAX ′ [3, 15] following those of EAX [8] . This illustrates the similarities and the differences of EAX and EAX ′ (See also the last part of this section).
EAX ′ is a mode of operation based on an n-bit blockcipher, E. Here we typically assume (n, E) = (128, AES-128), however other choice is possible [15] . The key of E is written as K. Formally, the encryption function of EAX ′ accepts a cleartext, N ∈ {0, 1} * with N ̸ = ε, a plaintext, M ∈ {0, 1} * , and a secret key, K, to produce the ciphertext, C ∈ {0, 1} * , with |C| = |M | and the tag T ∈ {0, 1} 32 . The decryption function, which we also call the verification function, accepts N , C, T , and K and generates the decrypted plaintext M if (N, C, T ) is valid, or the flag ⊥ if invalid. Cleartext N contains information that needs to be authenticated, but not encrypted. ANSI document requires that N must be unique for all encryptions using the same key 6 . Hence N can be seen as a combination of a nonce and associated data in the standard terminology of AE (e.g., see [8] ). The plaintext M can be the empty string ε, corresponding to the null string in [15] , and in this case EAX ′ works as a message authentication code for N .
For generality we assume that the tag length is specified by a predetermined parameter, τ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The original definition employs τ = 32. Let EAX ′ [E, τ ] be EAX ′ using n-bit blockcipher E with τ -bit tag. The corresponding encryption and decryption algorithms are written as EAX ′ -E K,τ and EAX ′ -D K,τ . If τ is clear from the context we may write EAX ′ [E] and EAX ′ -E K and EAX ′ -D K . These algorithms and their components are shown in Fig. 1 . The encryption algorithm of EAX ′ is depicted in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 1 , α denotes an n-bit constant, (1 n−32 ∥01 15 ∥01 15 ). Note that CBC ′ K (0 n , M ) is equivalent to the standard CBC-MAC using E K with input M , denoted by CBC K (M ). In our description, we fixed an apparent error in line 72 of the original definition of EAX ′ .encrypt K in [3, 15] . Some editorial errors of [15] were also pointed out by [1] . EAX ′ and the Original EAX. The major differences between EAX ′ and the original EAX are summarized as follows. For other minor differences, see Section 3 of [15] . For the definition of EAX, see [8] .
1. Role of N . Inputs to EAX ′ -E K consist of a cleartext N and a plaintext M , whereas those to the original EAX consist of a nonce N , a header (or associated data) H, and a plaintext M . EAX ′ requires N to be unique, hence it works as a nonce. EAX ′ does not explicitly define a header H; information corresponding to the header is included in the cleartext N . 2. Tweaking method for CMAC. For input M , CMAC [2] 
The original EAX uses the tweaked CMAC having an n-bit tweak t, defined as CMAC K (t∥M ), for t ∈ {0 n , 0 n−1 1, 0 n−2 10}, to process N , H, and C. For fast operation we need to precompute E K (t) for all t and store them to RAM. EAX ′ employs a different way to tweak CMAC accepting two tweak values (i = 0, 1) to generate CMAC ′ (0) K and CMAC ′ (1) K for processing N and C. For fast operation we can precompute L = E K (0 n ). This reduces the precomputation time and RAM consumption from the original EAX. 3. Counter mode incrementation. The original EAX uses CMAC K (0 n ∥N ) as an initial counter block for CTR mode, while that of EAX ′ is CMAC ′ (0) K (N ) ∧ α to set some bits to zero. One can find a similar zeroing-out in the deterministic authenticated encryption called SIV [17] . As explained by [17] , this contributes to a slight simpler operation. 
Here we assume the nonce-respecting adversary [16] ; it is allowed to query any (N i , M i ) to the encryption oracle as long as N i is unique.
K in the previous section conforms to that
The above observation immediately gives the following attacks:
Forgery attack 1 (|N | = n and |C| < n).
1. Prepare (N, C) such that |N | = n and |C| < n and C∥10 n−1−|C| = N . This attack always succeeds as the "valid" tag for
Forgery attack 2 (|N | < n and |C| = n). 
These attacks use only one forgery attempt and no encryption query. By using one encryption query the forgery attack is possible even when |N | = n and |C| = n: The above attack is almost always successful; unless C = 0 n we have
thus equals to T . The converse of Forgery attack 3 is also possible for |N | < n and |M | < n:
Forgery attack 4 (|N | < n and |M | < n).
1. Query (N, M ) with |N | < n and |M | < n to the encryption oracle. 2. Obtain (C, T ) (where |C| = |M | < n) from the oracle. 3. Query ( N , C, T ) to the verification oracle, where
Partially Selective Forgeries. A forgery is selective instead of existential, if the adversary can determine the content of the message to be forged. Since EAX ′ provides authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), the content of the message consists of both the confidential plaintext M and the non-confidential associated data (or cleartext) N . While the above attacks do not allow to choose M , the adversary can arbitrarily choose N (restricted to |N | ≤ n and, for |N | = n, N ̸ = 0 n ). In this sense, the forgery attacks above are partially selective.
Chosen-Plaintext Distinguishers
The forgery attacks above are based on the idea of generating (N, C) that makes the tag T = 0 τ . To distinguish EAX ′ -E K from a random encryption process, which produces (|M |+τ )-bit random sequence on receiving (N, M ), one can similarly make (N, M ) so that EAX ′ -E K will generate (C, T ) with T = 0 τ . As EAX ′ -E K returns T = 0 τ with probability 1 while the same event occurs with probability 1/2 τ with a random encryption process, this enables us to easily distinguish T from random with the distinguishing advantage almost 1, using only one encryption query. In this case, we have C = M with probability 1/2 i for both EAX ′ -E K and a random encryption process. Given the event C = M , we have
Distinguishing attack 1 (|N

Distinguishing attack 2 (|N
with probability 1 for EAX ′ -E K , while T = 0 τ occurs with probability 1/2 τ for the random encryption process. Thus, with probability 1/2 i the distinguisher succeeds with a high probability, which is non-negligible when i is small.
Chosen-Ciphertext Plaintext Recovery Attacks
Consider a triple (N * , C * , T * ) of cleartext N * , ciphertext C * and tag T * . The corresponding plaintext M * is unknown. The adversary can ask a decryption oracle, for the decryption of any (N, C, T ) under its choice, except for (N, C, T ) = (N * , C * , T * ) (otherwise, finding M * would be trivial). The adversary receives either ⊥ (if verification fails) or the decryption M of C. This is the setting in a chosen ciphertext attack. Below, we focus on plaintext recovery attacks, where the adversary actually finds (a part of) M * . We describe two attacks: the first for |N * | = n, the second for |N * | < n.
Plaintext recovery attack 1 (|N * | = n).
2. Prepare C with |C| < n and C∥10 n−1−|C| = N * and T = 0 τ . 3. Query (N * , C, T ) to the decryption oracle. Let M be the answer.
Compute the keystream KS
Since the decryption of (N * , C * , T * ) uses the same keystream KS, we now can compute the first |C| bits of M * , or the full M * if |M * | ≤ |C|. It succeeds for the same reason as Forgery attack 1 (unless N * = 0 n , in which case there is no C in Step 2, or C * ∥10 n−1−|C * | = N * and T * = 0 τ , in which case the decryption query in Step 3 makes the attack trivial).
Plaintext recovery attack 2 (|N
Query (N * , C, T ) to the decryption oracle. Let M be the answer.
Compute the keystream KS
Unless N * ∥10 n−1−|N * | = C * and T * = 0 τ , the attack succeeds for the same reason as Forgery attack 2.
Remarks
The Source of Attacks. Not to mention, our attacks cannot be applied on the original EAX having the proof of security. Our attacks exploit the wrong tweaking method of CMAC in EAX ′ . While the tweaking method in the original EAX provides a set of computationally independent PRFs, the tweaking method of EAX ′ fails to do this. For instance CMAC ′ (0)
which is unlikely to occur if CMAC ′ (0)
K and CMAC ′ (1) K were computationally independent. The SIV-like counter incrementation also increases the collision probability of counter blocks, however this only leads to a small degradation in security, as mentioned by [3] , hence our attacks do not rely on this fact. Applicability to ANSI C12.22 Protocols. All our attacks require |N | ≤ n. The forgery and distinguishing attacks also require |M |, |C| ≤ n, and the plaintext recovery attacks actually require at most the first n bits of the ciphertext. In addition, the forgery and plaintext recovery attacks could not be prevented by restricting the input length at encryption: one must implement the input length check at decryption as well.
One can find some examples that have |M | = n or |M | = 0 (i.e. the authentication of N ) with n = 128 in communication examples of ANSI C12.22 (Annex G of [3] ) or test vectors 7 of EAX ′ (Section V of [15] ). At the same time, we do not know 8 whether |N | > n holds for ANSI C12.22 protocols, even though the specification [15] does not, at least explicitly, regulate the length of cleartext. The reference code of EAX ′ given by [3, 6] has no restriction on input lengths, and we verified our attacks with that code.
A natural question arises from the above observation: whether EAX ′ is provably secure under the restriction |N | > n. In the next section we provide a positive answer to this question.
Provable Security for More-than-One-Block Cleartext
Now we are going to prove that EAX ′ provides the provable security when the cleartext N is always more than n bits for both encryption and decryption. Combined with the attacks described in the previous section, the result of this section draws a sharp distinction on the security between the case |N | > n and the case |N | ≤ n. Security Notions. Following [8, 16] 
We also define random-bit oracle, $, which takes (N, M ) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * and returns (C, T )
We assume A in the privacy notion is nonce-respecting, i.e., all N i s are distinct. Similarly, a CCA-
The encryption and decryption queries made by A are denoted by (
The definitions of σ N and σ M are the same as above. The authenticity notion for a CCA-adversary A is defined as
where
We assume A in the authenticity notion is always nonce-respecting with respect to encryption queries; using the same N for encryption and decryption queries is allowed, and the same N can be repeated within decryption queries, i.e. N i is different from N j for any j ̸ = i but N i may be equal to N j or N i ′ for some j and i ′ ̸ = i. Bounds. We denote EAX ′ using an n-bit URP as a blockcipher by EAX ′ [Perm(n), τ ] and the corresponding encryption and decryption functions by EAX ′ -E P and EAX ′ -D P . Similarly, the subscript K in the component algorithms is substituted with P, e.g. CMAC ′ (i) P . We here provide the security bounds for EAX ′ [Perm(n), τ ]; the computational counterpart for EAX ′ [E, τ ] is trivial. The security bound for the privacy notion is as follows. 8 In [15] , "Justification" of Issue 6 (in page 3) states that "The CMAC ′ computations here always involve CBC of at least two blocks". This looks odd since M or C can be null (as stated by ANSI) and CMAC ′ taking the empty string certainly operates on the single-block CBC, but it may be a hint that |N | > n would hold for any legitimate ANSI C12.22 messages. 
The security bound for the authenticity notion is as follows. 
6 Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Overview
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are bit long, hence we first provide the overview. The basic strategy follows from the proof of the original EAX [8] with some extensions taken from OMAC proofs [11, 12] . We first break down the algorithm of EAX ′ [Perm(n), τ ] into a pair of functions, which we call OMAC-extension, OMAC-e (1) takes a ciphertext, C, and produces CMAC ′ (1) 10 , following the proof of OMAC [11] . Using two random values in addition to U , these functions are built so that they behave close to a set of independent URFs or URPs, and at the same time have the capability to perfectly simulate OMAC-e[P] (hence EAX ′ [Perm(n)]). The indistinguishability of Q from the set of URPs/URFs is relatively easy to derive, and as a result the following analysis becomes much easier.
Proof
Setup. Without loss of generality and for simplicity this section assumes that the space of valid cleartexts of EAX ′ is {0, 1} >n , rather than restricting the adversary's strategy.
For convenience we introduce the following notions. Let F K : X → Y and G K ′ : X → Y be two keyed functions with K ∈ K and K ′ ∈ K ′ , and let A be the CPA-adversary. We define 
where the underlying A is assumed to be nonce-respecting for encryption queries. Note that we have Adv
(A) for any nonce-respecting CPA-adversary A.
Step 1: OMAC-extension. For x ∈ {0, 1} ≤n , let bp(x) = x if |x| = n and bp(x) = x∥ 10 n−1−(|x| mod n) if |x| < n. If x = ε then bp(x) = 10 n−1 . We first define OMAC-extension using an n-bit URP, denoted by OMAC-e[P] : {0, 1} × {0, 1} * × N → ({0, 1} n ) >0 . The definition is given in Fig. 3 . See also Fig. 4 . Actually it consists of two functions, written as
OMAC-e[P]
where the first argument to OMAC-e[P], t ∈ {0, 1}, specifies which function to be used, i.e.,
OMAC-e[P](0, X, d) = OMAC-e[P] (0) (X, d) and OMAC-e[P](1, X, d) = OMAC-e[P] (1) (X) (d is discarded). Here |OMAC-e[P] (0) (X, d)| = (d + 1)n. For simplicity we assume the input domain of OMAC-e[P] is a set of (t, X, d) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} * × N that is acceptable for OMAC-e[P] (t) .
More formally, when t = 0 we assume |X| > n and d ∈ N, and when t = 1 we assume d is fixed (say 0). As described in Section 6.1, OMAC-e[P] enables us to simulate EAX ′ -E P and EAX ′ -D P ; note that the simulator only needs to compute the sum of two outputs from CMAC ′ (0) P and CMAC ′ (1) P , and not to compute the output itself. For instance, if we want to perform EAX ′ -E P for
(1, C, 0), where the last argument is arbitrary, (4) T ← msb τ (Y ⊕ Y ′ ), and (5) output (C, T ). The following proposition is easy to check.
Proposition 1. There exist deterministic procedures, f e (·) and f d (·), that use OMAC-e[P] as a black box and perfectly simulate EAX ′ -E P and EAX ′ -D P . That is, we have
A keyed function F compatible with OMAC-e[P] is said to have OMAC-e profile, and we denote F (t, X, d) by F (t) (X, d). Suppose an adversary querying F of OMAC-e profile hasueries (t 1 , X 1 , d 1 ) 
if |X| mod n ̸ = 0 or X = ε then w ← 1, else w ← 0 (note: w ← w(X)) 12 if t = 0 (note: m ≥ 2 holds for valid queries) 13 Y Fig. 3 . OMAC-extension using an n-bit URP, P.
Definition 1. Let
, and let Q 10 : {0, 1} n \ {0 n } → {0, 1} n . These functions are defined as
where P is an n-bit URP, and L = P(0 n ), and Rnd 1 and Rnd 2 are independent n-bit random sequences, and U is another random n-bit value. Here,
The sampling procedures for P, Rnd 1 , Rnd 2 , and U are shared by all Q i s.
We also treat Q as a tweakable function with tweak t ∈ {1, . . . , 10} by writing Q(t, x, d) = Q t (x, d) when t ∈ {5, 6} and otherwise Q(t, x, d) = Q t (x). We can easily see that OMAC-e[P] can be simulated with black-box access to Q, just the same as Q functions appeared in the proof of OMAC [11] that simulate OMAC. 10 . For all i = 1, . . . , 10, Q i is compatible with Q i .
Definition 2. Let P 1 , . . . , P 4 be four independent n-bit URPs, and let R 7 , . . . , R 10 be four independent n-bit URFs, and let R 5 and R 6 be two independent URFs with n-bit input and (d max +1)n-bp +1 +1
OMAC-e[P]
(0)
(1)
Fig. 4. Component Functions of OMAC-extension.
Here D and Q denote 2L and 4L with L = P(0 n ), and U is uniformly random over n bits.
bit output. Using them we define
. Here d max is the maximum possible value of queried d, which will be determined by the underlying game and the adversary's parameter.
We say a function compatible with Q is said to have Q profile. An adversary querying a function of Q profile is characterized by the number of queries, q, and the total sum of output n-bit blocks for t ∈ {5, 6}, σ out . The next lemma shows the CPA-advantage in distinguishing Q and Q. Lemma 1. Let A be the adversary querying a function of Q profile with parameter list (q, σ out ).
Then we have Adv
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Step 2: Modified CBC-MAC. For any n-bit (keyed) permutations, G and G ′ , let CBC G,G ′ : ({0, 1} n ) >0 → {0, 1} n be defined as
where CBC G ′ is the standard CBC-MAC using G ′ . We then define a function compatible with OMAC-e[P], denoted by CBC. For any X ∈ {0, 1} * , let w(X) = 1 if |X| mod n ̸ = 0 or X = ε and otherwise w(X) = 0. For |X| > n, CBC (0) (X, d) is computed as follows.
X[1]∥X[2]∥ . . . ∥X[m]
n ← X and w ← w(X)
Here, if d = 0 the output is Y . Similarly, for X ∈ {0, 1} * , CBC (1) (X) is computed as follows.
The pseudo-code of CBC (combining CBC (0) and CBC (1) ) is presented in Fig. 5 . Here, R 
]). For more examples, OMAC-e[P]
(1, C, 0) for |C| = n can be simulated via calling Q 9 (C). For |C| < n, OMAC-e[P](1, C, 0) can be simulated via calling Q 10 (bp(C)) = Q 10 (C∥10 . . . 0). Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There exists a procedure h(·) that uses Q as a black box and perfectly simulates OMAC-e[P], i.e. h(Q) ≡ OMAC-e[P]. Moreover, we have h( Q) ≡ CBC for this h(·).
Let RND (0) and RND (1) be the independent random functions compatible with OMAC-e[P] (0) and OMAC-e[P] (1) . Here, 
We define RND as a function consisting of RND (0) and RND (1) and taking t = 0, 1 as a tweak. Then, we have the following lemma. The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Let A be an adversary querying a function of OMAC-e profile with parameter list
Step 3: Derivation of PRIV Bound. Combining the above lemmas and propositions, our PRIV bound is derived. Let A be the CPA-adversary against AE with parameter list (q, σ N , σ M ).
Then there exist adversary B querying to a function of OMAC-e profile with 2q queries, σ in = σ N + σ M input blocks, and σ out = σ M + 2q output blocks, and adversary C querying to a set of ten functions with Q profile, using σ N + σ M queries and σ M + q output n-bit blocks for queries with t = 5, 6, such that
≤ Adv 
cpa-nr fe(OMAC-e[P]),fe(CBC)
= Adv
as q ≤ σ N . Here, the second equality in Eq. (7) follows from Prop. 1, Eq. (10) follows from Prop. 2, Eq. (11) follows from Lemma 2, and Eq. (12) follows from Lemma 1. In addition, Adv cpa-nr fe(RND), (A) = 0 holds because when A queries (N, M ) to f e (RND) the output is a subsequence of RND (0) (N, |M | n ) with the first n bits XORed by the output of RND (1) (whose input is a part of RND (0) (N, |M | n )). As N is always fresh, the output is always random. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Step 4: Derivation of AUTH Bound. The AUTH bound is derived in a similar way. Let EAX ′ be the AE algorithm compatible with EAX ′ [Perm(n)] using f e (RND) and f d (RND) for the encryption and decryption algorithms. We let A be the CCA-adversary against AE with parameter list (q, q v , σ N , σ M , σ N , σ C ) . Then we have the following bound.
Adv auth EAX
The proof of Eq. (14) is in Appendix C. Then, there exist adversary B querying to a function of OMAC-e profile with 2(q+q v ) queries with σ in = σ N +σ M +σ N +σ C and σ out = σ M +2q+σ C +2q v , and adversary C querying to a function of Q profile with σ N + σ M + σ N + σ C queries and σ M + q + σ C + q v output blocks for queries with t = 5, 6, such that
Algorithm CBC (given dmax):
if t = 0 (note: m ≥ 2 holds for valid queries) 13 Y
. CBC using four n-bit URPs, four n-bit URFs, and two n-bit input, (dmax + 1)n-bit output URFs.
since q ≤ σ N and q v ≤ σ N . Here, Eq. (16) 
Fixing the Flaw
There would be ways to fix the flaw of EAX ′ to make it as a secure general-purpose AE accepting cleartexts of any length. Below, we provide some of them, naming it to EAX ′′ . The concept here is not to touch the inside of EAX ′ , instead using it as a black box. We only propose the fixes for encryption, as the corresponding decryptions are fairly straightforward.
Method 1: EAX
Method 2: Use two keys for E, K and K ′ , and let
where K and K ′ are independent or K ′ = K ⊕ cst for a non-zero constant cst. The choice of cst must be done with care to avoid related-key attacks. For instance, letting cst = 1 |K| seems natural while this is problematic with DES due to the complementary property of the key schedule. One option is to use a random-looking constant, say the first few digits of π. Method 3: Use a key for E, K, and an independent n-bit key, L, and let
The security bounds of the above methods are easily derived from the results of Theorems 1 and 2. For the latter option of Method 2 we also need a very restricted form of relatedkey security of E, and for Method 3 we need the theory of tweakable blockcipher [13] . Each method has its own pros and cons: Method 1 is the simplest but needs additional blockcipher calls irrespective of |N |. Methods 2 and 3 keep the original operation for |N | > n, but need additional key or a stronger security requirement on E. We also warn that Method 3 allows a partial key recovery attack with birthday complexity.
Concluding Remarks
Practical Implications. Attacks as those described in the current paper are often turned down by non-cryptographers as "only theoretical" or "don't apply in practice". Indeed, none of our attacks is applicable if the cleartext size exceeds n bits. But even if ANSI C12.22 prohibited any cleartexts of size n = 128 bits or shorter, including EAX ′ in the standard would be like an unexploded bomb -waiting to go off any time in the future. Remember that EAX ′ is intended for Smart Grid, i.e., for the use in dedicated industrial systems such as electrical meters, controllers and appliances. It hardly seems reasonable to assume that every device will always carefully check cleartexts and plaintexts for validity and plausibility. Also, vendors may be tempted to implement their own nonstandard extensions avoiding "unnecessarily long" texts.
For a non-cryptographer, assuming a "decryption oracle" may seem strange -if there were such an oracle, why bother with message recovery attacks at all? However, experience shows that such theoretical attacks are often practically exploitable. For example, some error messages return the input that caused the error: "Syntax error in 'xyzgarble'." Even if the error message does not transmit the entire fake plaintext, any error message telling the attacker whether the fake message followed some syntactic conventions or not is potentially useful for the attacker. See [10] for an early example.
Also note that our forgery attacks allow a malicious attacker to create a large number of messages with given single-block cleartexts and random single-block plaintexts, that appear to come from a trusted source, because the authentication succeeded. What the actual devices will do when presented with apparently valid random commands is a source of great speculation. Our Recommendation. Whenever possible, avoid adopting EAX ′ in new applications. If EAX ′ cannot be avoided, then this has to be carefully implemented to exclude one-block cleartexts. We note that specifying the minimum data length in standard documents does not necessarily prevent the adversary from using short cleartexts. Therefore, the cleartext length checking mechanisms are needed at both ends of encryption and decryption. Instead, one can safely use EAX ′′ which allows the re-use of EAX ′ implementations. Other provably secure authenticated encryptions, including the original EAX, are also safe options.
Similarly let omask(t, Rnd 1 , Rnd 2 , U ) be the outer masking value applied to the leftmost n bits of the output, defined as;
We may abbreviate mask(i, L, Rnd 1 , Rnd 2 ) and omask(j, Rnd 1 , Rnd 2 , U ) to mask(i) and omask(j).
From the property of Galois field it is easy to see that 
Recall that when t i = 10, we have mask(t i ) = 0 n and X i ̸ = 0 n . We observe that L, Rnd 1 , Rnd 2 , and U have no effect on the output distribution of GameR, thus they are independent of adversary's choice, X 1 , . . . , X q . Combined with Eq. (26), this fact shows that the probability of the each of the first two events is at most 1/2 n . For the third event (Eq. (28)), the independence of U from mask(t i ) shows that the probability is at most the point probability of U ∧ α. As α fixes two bits of U to 0, it is at most 1/2 n−2 .
We next focus on bad at line 19, which implies the occurrence of one of the three sub-events (when t i , t j ∈ {5, 6}),
For the first two events, the probability is bounded by 1/2 n−2 from the independent distribution of U . For the third one, without loss of generality we assume i < j (when i = j the probability is trivially 0). Then Y j is independent of Y i and U , implying that the probability is bounded by 1/2 n−2 .
Thus, each sub-event occurs with probability at most 1/2 n−2 . By counting the number of sub-events, we have
We also need to evaluate the distinguishing advantage of R and Q. The difference between them is that R uses n-bit URFs for t = 1, . . . , 4 while Q uses n-bit URPs. For t = 5, . . . , 10 their behaviors are identical and independent of the responses for t = 1, . . . , 4. Hence we only need to consider the advantage in distinguishing (P 1 , . . . , P 4 ) from (R 1 , . . . , R 4 ) usingueries with tweak t ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Assume the adversary queries the i-th component for q i times. 
which concludes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 2
For the purpose of convenience, we define CBC Let us focus on the case t = 1. Then CBC can be seen as an information-theoretic variant of Carter-Wegman MAC, that is, CBC
(1) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a composition of two functions, where the first one (called hashing) takes an input to hash it into n bits, and the second one (called finalizing) takes that hashed value to compute the n-bit output. The hashing function applies CBC P 2 ,P 4 with bp( * ) for the final input block, or just applies bp( * ) to the input itself if the input is at most n bits. The finalizing function applies one of the 4 independent n-bit URFs, R 7 to R 10 , depending on the input length. For a pair of distinct inputs to CBC For a keyed function F : X → Y, let Coll F (q, σ) be the maximum collision probability of F 's outputs when accessed via q non-adaptive chosen-plaintext queries with total σ n-bit blocks.
As ( C, T ) ̸ = (C j , T j ) holds true, the probability of Eq. (45) is at most 1/2 τ . Here, note that the choice of C (e.g. choosing C = C j ′ for some j ′ ̸ = j) and the distribution of C 1 , . . . , C q , which can contain collisions on C i s, do not contribute to gaining the probability since the transcript obtained by the encryption queries completely hides the information on RND
(1) ( * ) no matter what C 1 , . . . , C q are, as N 1 , . . . , N q are unique 10 . This implies that Adv auth EAX ′ (A) = 1/2 τ , when q v = 1.
From Theorem B.2 of [7] , any AE scheme having the maximum forgery probability being ϵ when q v = 1 has the maximum forgery probability ϵ · q v when q v ≥ 1. Combining this with the above analysis of the case q v = 1, the proof is completed. 10 In other words, the posteriori probability distribution of RND
(1) (Ci) for any i, given ((N1, M1, C1, T1), . . . , (Nq, Mq, Cq, Tq)), is always independent and uniform over {0, 1}
n .
